Harden the edge: catch-all server, modern TLS and HSTS
- Unknown hostnames and direct IP access no longer land on the first vhost (Gitea): port 80 closes the connection, except for ACME challenges, and port 443 refuses the handshake. - Mozilla intermediate ciphers (forward secrecy only, no CBC), session cache, no session tickets, and HSTS with a short max-age for now. - Set X-Forwarded-For to the client address instead of appending to whatever the client sent.
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@@ -169,6 +169,13 @@ docker compose -f edge/compose.yml up -d
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starting. Upstreams use the target's `container_name` (see "Running it"
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above for why). Shared bits are in `edge/snippets/`. Check a change with
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`docker exec edge-nginx nginx -t`, then `docker exec edge-nginx nginx -s reload`.
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- **Unknown hostnames** hit `01-default.conf`: port 80 closes the connection
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(ACME challenges still work), port 443 refuses the TLS handshake. Nothing
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reaches a project unless its vhost names the host.
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- **TLS** settings (`snippets/tls.conf`) follow Mozilla's intermediate
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profile and send HSTS with a 1-day `max-age`. Raise it once every hostname
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is confirmed to work over https: browsers remember it, so a long value
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can't be taken back quickly.
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- **Certificates** are state, not versioned (`edge/certbot/`). To issue one
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for new hostnames (their DNS has to already point at the host):
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
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# Catch-all for Host headers no vhost claims (scanners, direct IP access,
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# stale DNS). Without it nginx hands them to the first vhost it loaded,
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# i.e. Gitea. ACME stays reachable here so a certificate for a new hostname
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# can be issued before its vhost exists.
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server {
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listen 80 default_server;
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listen [::]:80 default_server;
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server_name _;
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location /.well-known/acme-challenge/ {
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root /var/www/certbot;
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}
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location / {
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return 444;
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}
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}
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# No certificate to present for an unknown name, so refuse the handshake.
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server {
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listen 443 ssl default_server;
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listen [::]:443 ssl default_server;
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server_name _;
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ssl_reject_handshake on;
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}
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@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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# The edge is the first hop, so whatever X-Forwarded-For the client sent is
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# made up: replace it instead of appending to it.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
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proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
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proxy_set_header Connection $connection_upgrade;
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+12
-1
@@ -1,2 +1,13 @@
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# Mozilla "intermediate" profile, without the DHE suites (they'd need a
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# dhparam file): forward secrecy on every connection, no CBC.
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ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
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ssl_ciphers HIGH:!aNULL:!MD5;
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ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305;
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ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
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ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m;
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ssl_session_timeout 1d;
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ssl_session_tickets off;
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# Short max-age for now: raise it (e.g. 63072000) once every hostname is
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# confirmed working over https. A location that sets its own add_header
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# stops inheriting this one.
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add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=86400" always;
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